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Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

Recent Cases
No Federal Tax
Deduction Allowed for
Single Trust Serving
Both Charitable and
Noncharitable Purposes
In Estate of Johnson v. United
States, 941 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir.
1991), the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that a single
trust, created by a will, which
served both charitable and unlimited noncharitable purposes resulted in a split interest trust which
could not be reformed to satisfy the
requirements for the federal estate
tax charitable deduction.
Background
Forrest J. Johnson ("Johnson")
died in January of 1984, leaving a
will that created a multi-purpose
trust. The trust allocated funds to
support Johnson's three sisters, to
maintain the family graves, and to
establish a charitable trust to pay
for religious education in certain
Mississippi Catholic parishes.
In April of 1985, the estate filed
its federal estate tax return taking
no deduction for a charitable bequest. Almost two years later, the
estate requested authority from the
chancery court to create a nonprofit foundation in order to carry
out Johnson's charitable bequests.
Authority was granted in April of
1987, with the foundation being
incorporated in June. In October
of 1987, a set amount of funds was
transferred to the foundation, and
the Internal Revenue Service
("I.R.S."), relying on Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code, declared the foundation exempt from federal taxation.
In that same month, the executor of Johnson's estate claimed a
refund of federal estate taxes previously paid, based on the funds
subsequently transferred to the
foundation as a charitable donation. The I.R.S. denied the claim.
In January of 1989, the chancery
court granted the request made by
the court-appointed representative
100

of Johnson's only living sister to
interpret the will as establishing
three separate trusts, with each
trust serving a separate purpose.
The chancery court approved the
establishment of a $100,000 trust
in the name of Johnson's sister for
her continuing care, with the funds
remaining at the sister's death to be
transferred to the charitable foundation. The remainder of the estate
was not designated to either trust.
In February of 1989, the estate
sued the I.R.S. in the United States
District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi, seeking a
refund of the estate taxes denied by
the I.R.S. The district court granted the estate's motion for summary
judgment, holding that Johnson's
will created three separate trusts
and, therefore, no split interest
trust existed. The United States
appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit.
Will Created a Split Interest
Bequest
The appellate court reversed
and held that Johnson's will did
intend to create a split interest
bequest, citing the language of the
will describing the purposes of the
trust. The court also found that no
basis existed for separating the
non-charitable, open-ended bequests, regarding care for Johnson's sisters and family grave
maintenance, from the charitable
bequests. The court cited the case
as a classic example of a split
interest trust because both charitable and non-charitable beneficiaries were granted an interest in the
same property.
The Fifth Circuit explained that
estate tax deductions were disallowed under 26 U.S.C. Section
2055(e)(2) of the Internal Revenue
Code where interests in the same
property were passed to both charitable and non-charitable recipients. Congress enacted this section
in 1969 to prevent abuse of the tax
code by trusts with primarily noncharitable interests that bequest
only residual amounts to charita-

ble interests. Under that law, estates had to distinguish and assess
the amounts designated to charitable beneficiaries separately from
amounts designated to non-charitable beneficiaries. Johnson's trust
did not make such a distinction.
Further, Johnson's trust failed to
qualify under the limited exception
found in Section 2055(e)(2)(A) of
the Internal Revenue Code, which
allows deductions for only three
specific split remainder interests:
charitable remainder annuity
trusts, charitable remainder unitrusts, and pooled income funds.
The appellate court explained that
in those specific instances, the
I.R.S. was able to determine the
total amount bequested to the noncharitable recipient and, therefore,
could distinguish the charitable
bequests.
No Charitable Deduction Allowed
The Fifth Circuit held that the
estate's refund claim should have
been denied because the trust was
disallowed as a charitable deduction under Section 2055(e)(2), due
to its split interest nature. It further
failed to qualify under Section
2055(e)(3), which enables initially
nondeductible charitable bequests
to become deductible through the
amending of the will to make the
bequest fit one of the Section
2055(e)(2) qualified exceptions.
The court held that Johnson's will
could not be reformed to fit one of
the three qualified interests under
Section 2055(e)(2).
The appellate court distinguished the instant case from a
case involving a split interest trust
that paid three life interests of
$100 a month to noncharitable
beneficiaries. In the latter case, the
noncharitable interests could be
satisfied through the purchase of
three annuities. Thus, the funds
going toward the noncharitable
beneficiaries could be limited, and
thereby firmly separated from the
funds designated for the charitable
recipients; the trust could be reformed to qualify under Section
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2055(e)(2) as a charitable annuity
remainder trust.
The court held that Johnson's
trust could not be reformed to
meet one of the Section 2055(e)(2)
exceptions while still complying
with the terms of the will. Even
though a contract could have been
bought to satisfy the family grave
maintenance, no upward limit existed on the amount required to
support Johnson's remaining sister
due to the unpredictable costs of
medical care. Therefore, the
amount of funds needed to fulfill
the noncharitable bequests could
not be accurately assessed until
after all of Johnson's sisters had
passed away. As a result, the funds
to the charitable beneficiaries
could only be assessed after all the
sisters were deceased.
Lastly, the Fifth Circuit held
that the statutory language of the
Internal Revenue Code was clear,
and no express Congressional intent supported an exception in this
case.
Gwen M. Geraghty

paper"), in July 1990, requested
copies of itemized phone bills for
the office and car-phone lines of the
Passaic County Board of Chosen
Freeholders' ("Board"). Some of
these bills included date, time,
length of call, amount of charge,
and phone number called. The
Newspaper made its request pursuant to New Jersey's Right-to-Know
Law, N.J.Stat.Ann. 47:A-1 to -4,
and a parallel right of access to
public records under New Jersey
common law.
The Board denied the Newspaper's request on both grounds.
First, the Board claimed that the
Right-to-Know Law allowed access
to the total amounts of a phone bill
but not to the entire itemized
document. Second, the Board argued that the public's interest in
reviewing the itemized phone bills
did not outweigh the governmental
need for confidentiality; therefore,
the Board denied the Newspaper's
request for access under the common law as well. Consequently, the
Newspaper sued in the Superior
Court, Law Division, Passaic
County, seeking access to the requested records.

New Jersey Supreme
Court Finds County
Board's Itemized Phone
Bills Are Not Public
Records

Proceedings in the Lower Courts

In North Jersey Newspapers Co.
v. Passaic County Board of Chosen
Freeholders, 601 A.2d 693 (N.J.
1992), the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that the state's Rightto-Know statute did not create an
unqualified right of access to a
public body's itemized telephone
billing records that disclosed the
identity of the parties called. Furthermore, the telephone bills were
not accessible under New Jersey
common law because the public's
need for the identity of the parties
called did not outweigh the governmental policies of confidentiality
in telephone communications and
executive privilege.
Background
To uncover possible misuse of
public funds, the North Jersey
Newspapers Company ("NewsVolume 4 Number 3/Spring, 1992

The trial court granted the
Newspaper unlimited access to the
itemized phone bills. The court
concluded that because itemized
phone bills are not specifically exempted from the Right-to-Know
Law, the Newspaper should have
access to the records it sought. The
court also found that common-law
standards required accessibility
because the constitutional and privacy interests of persons telephoned by Board officials did not
outweigh the public's interest in
reviewing the phone bills. The
Board appealed to the Superior
Court, Appellate Division.
The appellate court agreed that
the phone bills were public records
accessible under the Right-toKnow Law. However, the appellate
court reversed the trial court, finding that the Board's privacy interests not only were protected by the
New Jersey Constitution but also
outweighed the public's interest in
reviewing the phone bills. Therefore, the appellate court ruled, the
Newspaper should not have unlim-

ited access to the requested records. The Newspaper appealed to
the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
Right-to-Know Law
Does Not Apply
The supreme court disagreed
with the appellate court's statutory
analysis and found that the Rightto-Know Law did not apply to
itemized phone bills. The appellate
court's judgement was modified
accordingly.
In finding that the Right-toKnow Law did not apply to itemized phone bills, the supreme court
distinguished public records accessible under the Right-to-Know
Law from public records accessible
under the common law. Under the
Right-to-Know Law, the public has
an unqualified right to inspect public documents only if the documents are records "required by law
to be made, maintained or kept on
file." In contrast, records accessible under New Jersey common law
are records made by public officers
in the exercise of their public functions. The public's right to inspect
common-law records depends on
whether the public's need for the
records outweighs the government's need for confidentiality.
The Newspaper claimed the
itemized phone bills were covered
by the Right-to-Know Law because
the Board was required to record
all the details of its telephone bills
under the Local Fiscal Affairs Law.
The Local Fiscal Affairs Law requires public agencies submitting
requests for anticipated expenses
to make available a detailed bill of
items on demand. Furthermore,
the Newspaper claimed, the standard of "detailed" in the Local
Fiscal Affairs Law was meant to
grow with the times and included
information that was routinely
available. Modern technology allows telephone companies to routinely provide customers with information such as date, time,
length of a call, number called, and
charge for a call. Therefore, the
Newspaper argued, because such
information was routinely available, public agencies such as the
Board were required to make itemized phone bills available to the
(continued on page 102)
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